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Abstract 
When economists have to choose between competing theories, they evaluate not 
only the theories’ empirical relevance, but also qualities like their simplicity, tracta-
bility, parsimony and unifying power. These are called the epistemic virtues of a 
theory. The present paper proposes a formal definition for some epistemic virtues 
and investigates their role for theory choice in economics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In defending an economic theory from allegations of lack of realism and factual 
relevance, mainstream economists often appeal to some non-empirical quality of the 
theory: among others, to its simplicity, tractability, parsimony of assumptions, ex-
actness of implications or unifying power. In epistemological discourse, these quali-
ties are called the theoretical or epistemic virtues of a theory. Epistemic virtues are 
relevant not only in theory defence but also in theory choice. When economists have 
to choose between a theory 0T , which is at odds with robust empirical evidence but 
is parsimonious and has numerous clear-cut implications, and an alternative theory 
1T , which captures better the empirical data but is more cumbersome, has many ad 
hoc assumptions, or less exact implications, economists typically choose 0T . 
As an instance of the relevance of epistemic virtues in economic theory choice, we 
can think of the case of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Since the 1950s a large 
amount of experimental evidence has been collected showing that individuals in 
many relevant circumstances do not behave as expected-utility maximizers. In the 
last thirty years decision theorists have proposed numerous alternative theories that 
capture the individual behavior under uncertainty better than EUT1. However, it is 
difficult to find these non-expected utility theories used in branches of theoretical 
economics different from decision theory or in applied economics (for instance, in 
game theory strategic uncertainty is modeled almost exclusively through EUT). As 
Larry Samuelson pointed out in a recent survey on the relationship between eco-
nomic theory and experiments, the informal explanation for this state of affairs 
“typically is that for most applications, expected utility theory’s lack of realism is a 
reasonable price to pay for its simplicity” (Samuelson 2005: 76). 
So the question is: Why are epistemic virtues so relevant, in science in general and 
in mainstream economics in particular? How much weight should the epistemic vir-
tues of a theory receive, compared with its empirical relevance? And further: How 
many epistemic virtues are there? What exactly does each of them amount to? 
There is no shared opinion about these issues among philosophers of science, and 
this seems due to the qualitative and vague nature of epistemic virtues. As Thomas 
Kuhn observed with respect to the role of epistemic virtues in theory choice,  
 
 
                                                 
1 For a review of the alternatives to EUT, see Starmer 2000. 
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Two sorts of difficulties are regularly encountered by men who must use these 
criteria in choosing [among theories]. [...] Individually, the criteria are impre-
cise: individuals may legitimately differ about their application to concrete 
cases. In addition, when deployed together, they repeatedly prove to conflict 
with one another (Kuhn 1977: 322). 
 
In my opinion, the difficulties encountered in defining and handling epistemic vir-
tues have caused an underestimation of their role in scientific theory choice, espe-
cially in economics. Traditional methodological appraisals of economic science fo-
cus on the verification, falsification, testing, or the predictive power of a theory, but 
rarely discuss the role of its epistemic virtues in determining its acceptance and suc-
cess among economists. In the present paper I propose a formal definition for some 
epistemic virtues and attempt to assess their role for theory choice in economics. 
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the distinction between the 
syntactic and semantic view of theories. From a syntactic point of view, a theory is 
only a logical-mathematical structure. On the other hand, when we consider the rela-
tionship between the theory and the world, the viewpoint is semantic. Section 3 
looks at epistemic virtues as syntactic properties of a theory. Section 4 proposes an 
analytical treatment of a number of epistemic virtues. In particular, the epistemic 
virtue of “systematicity” appears to summarize most of the other epistemic virtues of 
a theory. Section 5 defines the notion of “semantic virtuosity” of a theory, and points 
out that economists typically face a trade-off between the pursuit of systematicity 
and that of semantic virtuosity. Section 6 suggests that, facing that trade-off, econo-
mists attempt to maximize the semantic virtuosity of their theories, yet without low-
ering the level of systematicity already attained. In other words, theory choice in 
economics appears to be driven by the principle “more semantic virtuosity, but 
without loss of systematicity”. The Appendix presents a case-study showing how 
this rule allows us to rationalize the early developments of demand theory. Section 7 
summarizes the paper and discussed the issues it leaves open. 
Even if the paper addresses epistemological topics, its style should nevertheless be 
familiar to economists. In fact, not only are the examples illustrating the notions in-
troduced in the work taken from microeconomics, but the notions themselves are of-
ten defined through concepts commonly used in economics. In particular, the paper 
exploits the concepts of ordering, completeness, trade-off, constrained maximiza-
tion, as well as the “as if” methodology typical of economics. 
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2. A SYNTACTIC-SEMANTIC VIEW OF THEORIES 
Following the so-called Received View of scientific theories, I distinguish the theory 
as a logical-mathematical structure from the interpretations of the theory, which re-
late it to the world2. When we look at a theory as a logical-mathematical structure, 
we consider it from a syntactic viewpoint. When we are interested in the interpreta-
tions of the theory and its empirical relevance, our viewpoint is semantic. 
The theory as a logical-mathematical structure can be thought of as a hypothetico-
deductive machinery. A theory T  starts with a set of definitions , a 
set of assumptions  on the objects defined in 
{ }wdddD ,...,, 21=
{ aaA ,...,, 21= }na D , and uses various 
deductive procedures to generate a set of implications { }miiiI , 21 ,...,=  concerning the 
objects in D . In other words, a theory T  can be looked at as a function mapping a 
set of definitions D  and assumptions  into a set of implications A I  over D : 
IADT ×→×: D 3.  
For instance, EUT defines what a decision maker and his preference relation are, as 
well as certain properties of the preference relation and the notion of “lottery”. Then 
EUT assumes that the decision maker’s preference relation over lotteries is com-
plete, transitive, continuous, and that it satisfies the independence axiom. Finally, 
EUT proves that under these assumptions the decision maker’s preferences over lot-
teries can be represented by an expected utility function, in the sense that the deci-
sion maker chooses among the lotteries as if he maximized his expected utility. 
The interpretations assign an empirical meaning to the definitions, assumptions and 
implications of a theory, so connecting it to the world. If the elements of a theory 
can be interpreted in different ways, the theory can be applied to different portions 
of the world. For instance, a function ( )yxf ,  can be interpreted as the utility func-
tion of a consumer as well as the production function of a firm. In the first case the 
function is a brick of a theory of consumer demand, in the second one it belongs to a 
theory of production. 
                                                 
2 On the Received View of scientific theories see Suppe 1977. In economics, T.C. Koopmans 
(1957, especially the second essay) and G. Debreu (1959, especially the preface) stressed the dis-
tinction between the logical structure of the theory and its interpretations. 
3 This notion of theory is sufficiently abstract to cover what in the epistemological literature are 
called “models”, as distinct from theory. On the role of models in economics, see Morrison-
Morgan (1999). What I call “implications of the theory” are often called in the economic dis-
course “predictions of the theory”. However, the term prediction has a semantic connotation that 
is better avoided in considering the theory from the syntactic viewpoint. 
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To be sure, “the world” is not a ready-made thing that is out there. The world, and in 
particular the world of a scientist like the economist, is an entity constituted through 
perception, introspection, commonsense considerations, anecdotal empiricism, sta-
tistical data, experimental findings, as well as through theoretical spectacles. Even 
conjectures and thought experiments contribute to constitute the world: if something 
might exist, in some sense it is part of the world. For instance, Giffen goods are 
more conjectural than real, but they certainly belong to the world of the demand 
theorist4. 
This is not the place to address metaphysical questions about what constitutes “the 
world”. Here I simply propose to identify the world with the set of evidences 
 available to the theorist. These evidences can be produced by per-
ception, introspection, real and thought experiments, commonsense considerations, 
statistical data etc. The interpretation of a theory connects its definitions, assump-
tions and implications to the set 
{ seeeE ,...,, 21= }
E  of available evidences. 
In general, the more the definitions, assumptions and implications of a theory are in 
accord with the available evidences, the more the theory is descriptively adequate 
and valuable. The lack of realism and empirical relevance often reproached in main-
stream economic theories can be seen as a failure of some of their parts to corre-
spond to the evidences in E . If we think of a theory as a function mapping a set of 
definitions D  and assumptions  into a set of implications A I  over D , a very rough 
measure of the degree of correspondence between theory and evidence could be 
given by the number of elements of D , , or A I  that match some element in E 5. 
Evidently, the problem is how to assess this “matching”, “correspondence” or “ac-
cord” between the constitutive elements of a theory and the evidences in E . The 
verificationism of Neopositivists, Popper’s falsificationism, probabilistic criteria for 
theory confirmation à la Bayes or Neyman-Pearson are possible answers to the 
problem, which however has found no unanimous solution. Moreover, the so called 
Duhem-Quine thesis made clear that the assessment of the correspondence between 
theory and evidence always depends on a series of auxiliary hypotheses6. This cir-
                                                 
4 For Giffen goods an increase in the price leads to an increase in the quantity demanded. Such a 
phenomenon is rare, but economically possible. Some economists, notably George Stigler (1947), 
argued that the Giffen goods do not exist in reality. More on Giffen goods and their importance 
for the development of consumer demand analysis in the Appendix. 
5 This idea is formalized in Section 5 below. 
6 On these issues, with particular reference to economics, see Hands 2001 and Guala 2005. 
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cumstance renders such assessment tricky, and this independently of the preferred 
epistemological approach. 
In the present work I do not address the semantic problem concerning the assess-
ment of the theory-evidence correspondence. I assume that in some way this prob-
lem can be solved, and that we can state whether a certain definition , assumption 
 or implication i  of the theory matches some evidence in 
d
a E . The focus here is on 
the syntactic properties of a theory, given its assessed degree of correspondence with 
the available evidences. 
 
3. EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AS SYNTACTIC VIRTUES 
In epistemological discourse there is no consensus about what the relevant epistemic 
virtues are. A partial list of characteristics that have been labeled as epistemic vir-
tues of a theory includes: simplicity, testability, fruitfulness, explanatory power, sys-
tematicity, neatness, generality, conservativeness, tractability, parsimony, exactness, 
unifying power, predictive power, coherence, breadth of scope, elegance, consis-
tency, and accuracy. Moreover, even if a certain feature of a theory is commonly 
recognized as an epistemic virtue (as in the case of simplicity), such a feature is de-
fined in different ways. 
To develop a more constructive treatment of epistemic virtues, I propose to employ 
the label “epistemic virtues” only for the syntactic properties of a theory. In this ac-
ceptation, epistemic virtues concern exclusively the formal features of a theory as a 
logical-mathematical structure. The qualities related to the semantic adequacy of the 
theory with the available evidences in E  should be referred to in a different way, 
namely as the semantic virtues of a theory. Therefore, if the accuracy of a theory is 
defined as the circumstance that it is “in demonstrated agreement with the results of 
existing experiments and observations” (Kuhn 1977: 321), then accuracy is a seman-
tic, not an epistemic virtue of the theory. Similarly, if predictive power is viewed as 
the aptitude of a theory to yield empirical predictions not contradicted by factual 
evidence, then predictive power is a semantic, not an epistemic virtue. 
 
4. FORMALIZING AND ORDERING EPISTEMIC VIRTUOSITY 
When epistemic virtues are considered as syntactic virtues of a theory, a formal 
treatment for some of them can be put forward. In particular, I discuss the virtues of 
parsimony, generality, explanatory power, unifying power, exactness of implica-
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tions, systematicity, tractability and simplicity. 
When possible, I suggest a numerical index that represents each of these virtues. The 
virtuosity index of 0T  with respect to, say, parsimony, has a higher value than the 
index of 1T  if and only if 0T  is more parsimonious than 1T . This is exactly the way 
the utility index represents the preferences of an individual. 
However it is not always possible to compare any two theories with respect to a cer-
tain epistemic virtue. In more technical terms, for some epistemic virtues the “virtu-
osity order” among theories is not complete. In these cases, no general index of epis-
temic virtuosity can be constructed, and we can only compare the virtuosity of par-
ticular pairs of theories. 
 
4.1. Parsimony 
It appears natural to relate the parsimony of a theory to the number of its assump-
tions: the more assumptions a theory has, the less parsimonious it is. More formally, 
if 
T
A  is the number of assumptions of theory T , and  is the parsimony of )(TP T , 
we can assign to  a number that is decreasing in )(TP
T
A : )()(
T
ApTP = , where 
 is a real-valued function with )(⋅p 0'<p . According to the parsimony index , if 
a theory 
)(TP
0T  has fewer assumptions than a theory 1T , that is, if 10 TT AA < , then 0T  is 
more parsimonious than 1T , that is, . )1() TP>( 0TP
A possible specification for the function )(⋅p  is the inverse function. In this case 
T
ATP 1)( = , and the parsimony index ranges between 1 (maximal parsimony) and 0 
(minimal parsimony). If in a theory a certain set of implications I  can be drawn 
from different sets of assumptions, it seems reasonable to choose the smallest  to 
compute the parsimony index of the theory. 
A
 
4.2. Generality 
Generality is a further property that is often mentioned as an epistemic virtue of a 
theory. The appreciation of this virtue is typically made in comparative judgments: 
we say that one theory is more general than another rather than that a theory is gen-
eral in some absolute sense.. Moreover, we compare the generality of theories deal-
ing with the same objects rather than theories concerning different fields. In particu-
lar, given two theories 0T  and 1T  dealing with the same set of objects D , 0T  is said 
to be more general than 1T  if the assumptions of 0T  on these objects are less restric-
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tive than the assumptions of 1T . 
T
sa
0
] T
sa
1
 
For instance, in game theory psychological games generalize standard games. 
Whereas in standard games the players’ utilities depend only on the actions they 
choose, in psychological games utilities may also hang on the belief the players har-
bor about some other element of the game. An example of psychological game is the 
tipping-game, where a client tips as much as he expects that the waiter expects to 
get, and suffers from guilt if he tips less7. 
More formally, let us consider an object  belonging to sd D , and label as [  the set 
of all theoretically possible forms, behaviors or realizations of . For instance, if 
 is the preference relation over lotteries of a decision maker, [  is the set con-
taining complete and incomplete, transitive and intransitive preferences. If  is the 
utility representation of a player’s preferences, [  contains all possible functional 
forms for the utility representation. Then let us label as  the assumption of theory 
]sd
sd
sd
sdsd ]
]sd
T
sa
T  on object , and as [  the possible forms, behaviors or realizations of d  as 
restricted by . For instance, EUT restricts the decision maker’s preference to be 
complete and transitive. Standard game theory restricts the domain of the utility 
function to the set of actions chosen by the players. By definition [ . 
sd
T
sa
sd ] s
T
sa
]sd ⊆ ][ sd
If two theories 0T  and 1T  concern the same objects , ,…, , and make on 
these objects the assumptions , , …,  and , , …, a  respectively, 
then we can say that 
1d
1
1
Ta
2d
1
2
Ta
nd
T
n
0
1
Ta 02
Ta 0Tna 1
0T  is more general than 1T  if [ for every 
. 
1
] T
sa
d ⊆ [
0
] T
sa
d
ns ,...,2,1=
Clearly, this generality ordering is incomplete because it can be easily the case that 
neither  nor [  for every 
1
][ T
sa
d ⊆
0
][ T
sa
d d ⊆
1
][ T
sa
d s . Therefore, it makes little sense 
to propose an index for generality as we did in the case of parsimony. 
However, there exists an important relationship between generality and parsimony 
that allows us to focus on the latter: if 0T  is more general than 1T , then 0T  is also 
more parsimonious than 1T , that is, generality is a special case of parsimony. In fact, 
if 0T  is more general than T  we can think of 1T ’s assumptions as obtained from 
0T ’s assumptions by adding to them some further restrictive hypotheses. Hence 1T  
                                                
7 On psychological games see Geanakoplos-Pearce-Stacchetti 1989 and Battigalli-Dufwenberg 
2005. 
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has all the assumptions of 0T  plus such additional restrictive hypotheses, so that 1T  
is less parsimonious than 0T . The contrary doesn’t hold: if 0T  has less assumptions 
than 1T , it is not always the case that every assumption of 1T  can be thought of as an 
assumption of 0T  plus some additional restriction. 
T
I EP
T
I
) 0'>e 0
1T
(EP
T
I
 
4.3. Explanatory power 
A theory as a logical-mathematical structure produces implications about some of 
the objects it deals with, that is, about some of the elements of D . For instance, EUT 
produces implications about the preferences of the decision maker over lotteries, 
game theory yields implications about the actions chosen by the players in a game, 
and consumer theory carries implications about the demand for commodities. It 
seems reasonable to say that the more implications a theory yields, the more power-
ful it is in explaining the behavior of the objects it deals with. 
If a  is the number of implications of theory T , and  the explanatory-
power of 
)(T
T , we can then assign to  a number that is increasing in )(TEP : 
)(( eEP )T =
T
I , where  is a real-valued function with . If two theories (⋅e T  
and 1T  concern the same objects in D , the explanatory-power index assigns a higher 
value to the theory that yields more implications over these objects: if 0T II > , 
then . )1T)0T >(EP
A possible specification for the function )(⋅e  is the identity function. In this case, 
 is simply equal to )(TEP . 
 
4.4. Unifying power 
In general, there exists a trade-off between the parsimony and generality of a theory 
on the one side, and its explanatory power on the other side. In fact, we typically 
need more restrictive assumptions to obtain more implications. As far as generality 
can be considered as a special case of parsimony, the above trade-off can be reduced 
to the trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power: the number of implica-
tions of a theory is inversely correlated to the number of its assumptions. 
The unifying power of a theory can be seen as the epistemic virtue that combines its 
parsimony and explanatory power. More exactly, the unifying power of a theory T  
can be defined as its power to derive the largest possible set of implications from the 
smallest possible set of assumptions. The unifying-power index of T  – labeled as 
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)(TUP  – can then be thought of as an increasing function of the ratio between the 
number of implications and the number of assumptions of T : =)(TUP )(
TT
AIu , 
with . A possible specification for the function 0>'u )(⋅u  is the identity function. In 
this case, UP  is simply equal to )(T
TT
AI . 
]
sd
T
sd T
si
sd ]
d
]d
][d id ][
i]d
][d
 
4.5. Exactness of implications 
The implications of a theory do not simply concern some of the objects it deals with. 
Indeed, the implications of a theory restrict the possible behaviors, forms or realiza-
tions of these objects. For instance, the EUT decision maker prefers lotteries with a 
higher expected utility; the rational players of game theory do not play dominated 
strategies; consumer demand theory states that the substitution effect is non positive. 
It seems sensible to say that the more a theoretical implication i  restricts the possi-
ble behaviors of a certain object d , the more this implication is exact. It also seems 
reasonable to affirm that the aptitude to deliver implications as exact as possible is a 
further epistemic virtue of a theory. 
In order to formalize the notion of exactness of implications, let us employ the nota-
tion already introduced in discussing generality. [  is the set of all theoretically 
possible forms, behaviors or realizations of an object ,  is an implication of the-
ory 
sd
T
si
 on object d , and [  are the possible forms, behaviors or realizations of 
 as restricted by . By definition [ . When no comparison among dif-
ferent implications and theories is at issue, we can omit the indexes 
s
T
si
T
si
sd ]
⊆ ][ sd
T  and s , and 
simply talk of an object , the set of its possible realizations [ , and the set [  of 
the possible realizations of  as restricted by implication i . 
d ] i]d
d
Let us consider first the simpler case when  displays only a finite number of pos-
sible behaviors or realizations. For instance, let us imagine that [  is the set of all 
strategy profiles that could be played in a simultaneous, one-shot game among two 
players. 
d
 is the number of elements in [ , and ]d  is the number of elements 
of [  whose realization in not excluded by implication . In our game-theoretic ex-
ample, if each of the two players has 3 strategies available, then  is equal to 9. If 
the players are rational and this fact is commonly known, an implication of the the-
ory of games is that the players will not play strategies dominated, even iteratively, 
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by other strategies8. If the strategy profiles surviving to the iterated elimination of 
dominated strategies (IEDS) are 4, then 4][ =id . 
When [  is a finite set it is possible to calculate the ratio ]d ][][ dd i . If  is a sharp 
implication of the theory, the ratio 
i
][][ dd i  is small. If instead i  is a loose implica-
tion, the ratio ][][ dd i  tends to 1. In our game-theoretic example, if 4[ =i]d  then 
]d[][d i = 94 . Instead, if only a strategy profile survives to the IEDS, then 
]d[][d i = 91 . 
In the finite case, it seems then quite natural to introduce the following index for the 
Exactness of an Implication i , labeled as : )(iEI
)(iEI =
][
][
d
d i−1  
For clear-cut implications EI  is close to 1, whereas for loose implications it is close 
to 0. As an extreme case, if a theory does not generate restrictive implications on , 
that is, if according to the theory “anything goes” with respect to ,  is equal to 
 and 
d
d id ][
][d EI  is equal to zero. In our game, if no strategy profile is eliminated by the 
IEDS, then EI = 0)99( =1− . 
If all implications of a theory T  concern objects that have only a finite number of 
behaviors or realizations, it is possible to define an index capturing the global exact-
ness of the implications of T . For each implication  concerning a specific object 
 we can compute the 
si
sd EI  relative to : si
)( siEI = ][
][
s
sis
d
d−1  
If theory T  has  implications i , , …, i , a possible index for the Global Exact-
ness of its Implications – let us label it  – is given by the sum of the indexes 
: 
m 1 2i m
(T )GEI
)( siEI
)(TGEI  =  = ∑
=
m
s
siEI
1
)( ∑−
=
m
s s
sis
d
d
m
1 ][
][
 
The more implications a theory has, and the more exact these implications are, the 
higher is GEI . If two theories 0T  and 1T  concern the same objects, and 
> GEI , on the whole the implications of )( 0TGEI )1(T 0T  are more exact than those of 
                                                 
8 On this, see for instance Brandenburger 1992. 
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1T . 
a
[
0Ti
[
Things get much more complex when the range of variation of an object  is not fi-
nite. For instance, if  is a price then [ =[
d
d ]d ),0 +∞ , or if  is the substitution effect 
on the demand for a good, [  might theoretically range in an interval [ , where 
 and  are positive numbers. 
d
]d ]− ,ba
b
If  is an infinite set, [  can be finite as well as infinite. For instance, demand 
theory generally implies that there is only one equilibrium price; in this case 
]d id ]
id ][ =1. 
Yet,  can also be an infinite set: one implication of standard consumer theory is 
that the substitution effect is non-positive, so that [ =[
id ][
id ] ]0,a− . In both cases, it 
makes little sense to calculate the ratio ][][ dd i . If [  is finite, id ] ][][ dd i  is equal 
to zero and this independently from the value of id ][ . This means that two implica-
tions, e.g., one stating that there is only one equilibrium price and another allowing 
for 100 possible equilibrium prices, would be equally exact. This is counterintuitive. 
On the other hand, if [  is an infinite set, it is not clear how to evaluate the ratio 
between the two infinite sets [  and [ . Therefore, if [  is an infinite set we 
have to set aside the ratio 
i]d
]d id ] ]d
]d [] di[  and renounce to the indexes of exactness EI  
and . GEI
In the infinite-[  case, a surrogate and much coarser indicator for the exactness of 
an implication  is [ -[ , that is, the set containing all realization of  excluded 
by . It seems reasonable to assume that the larger [ -[  is, the more exact i  is.  
]d
i ]d id ] d
i ]d id ]
This indicator can be employed to produce a partial ordering among specific impli-
cations of different theories. If two theories 0T  and 1T  display two different implica-
tions  and  on the same object d , and [ -[ -[ , then implication 
 is more exact than implication . Notice that [ -[ -[  if and only 
if . The latter expression is a more transparent way to state the condi-
tion assuring that  is more exact than . The exactness order among specific im-
plications of different theories is only partial because it can be easily the case that 
neither [ , nor [ . 
0Ti
0Ti
1Ti
1
] Ti
⊆ [
]d
1
] Ti
]d
d ⊆ [
d
]d
1
] Ti
0
] Tid
⊆ ][d1T
0
] Ti
i
[d
0
] Tid
]d ⊆
]
i
d
[d
0T
0Ti
1
] Ti
1Ti
d
1
] Tid ⊆
A possible ordering of theories according to the global exactness of their implica-
tions may be obtained in the following way. Consider two theories 0T  and 1T  con-
cerning the same objects in D  and recall that [  are the possible forms, behaviors T
si
sd ]
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or realizations of object  as restricted by implication i  of theory sd s T . We can 
imagine assigning one point to 0T  and zero point to 1T  for every s  such that 
, that is, for every implication of 
0
][ T
si
sd ⊆ 1][ Tsisd
0T  that is more exact than the corre-
sponding implication of 1T  on the same object . We can think of these points as 
“exactness points”. Similarly, for every 
sd
s  such that [ , that is, for every 
implication of 
1
] T
si
sd ⊆ [ 0] Tsisd
1T  that is more exact than the corresponding implication of 0T  on , 
we can assign to 
sd
1T  one exactness point and no point to 0T . If for some s  
=[ , then both theories get one point. Finally, if a theory has a restrictive 
implication on a certain object  whereas the other carries no implication about the 
same object, the former is more exact and gets the exactness point. 
1
][ T
si
sd
0
][ T
si
sd
0
] T
si
s
1
][ T
si
sd
d
⊆
sd
0
] T
si
sd ⊆ [
                                                
The theory that in the end gets more points can be considered the one whose impli-
cations are globally more exact. As far as it can easily be the case that neither 
 nor [ , also this order concerning the implications of a 
theory is incomplete. 
1
] T
si
sd
 
4.6. Systematicity 
Probably since Plato and Aristotle, in the Western tradition of thought, systematicity 
has been judged as a major virtue of scientific theories9. In particular, in the Critique 
of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant presents systematicity as the fundamental cognitive 
ideal that drives reason in the construction of scientific knowledge: 
 
Systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science. 
[…] Under the government of reason, our diverse cognitions […] must consti-
tute a system. Only so they can support and advance the essential ends of rea-
son […]. 
What reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to achieve concerning [the 
cognitions of our understanding] is their systematization, that is, to exhibit their 
connection with a single principle (Kant 1929 [1787]: B860 and B673, 
translation of N. Kemp Smith, slightly modified)10. 
 
Also for the Marburg School, a Neo-Kantian philosophical movement which at-
tained a leading position in German philosophy during the late 19th and early 20th 
century, systematicity is the essential feature of scientific knowledge. Ernst Cassirer, 
 
9 See on this Rescher 1974. 
10 On the importance of systematicity in Kant’s theory of knowledge, see Rescher 2000, especially 
pp. 64-98. 
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the main exponent of the Marburg School, writes in his Substance and Function 
that: 
 
Science does not have, and cannot have, a criterion of truth higher than unity 
and coherence in the systematic construction of the whole experience (Cassirer 
2000 [1910]: 203, my translation)11.  
 
More recently, the role of systematicity in scientific knowledge has been highlighted by C. 
Hempel (1965: 278-288), N. Rescher (1979, 2003) and P. Hoyningen-Huene (2001). 
The notion of systematicity used by these authors is not just syntactic. For them the 
systematicity of a scientific theory is also related semantically to the theory’s capac-
ity of explaining the empirical phenomena it investigates. Here I follow a different 
path. Even if I maintain the central role Kant or Cassirer assign to systematicity, I 
define it in a purely syntactic way. More exactly, by systematicity of a theory I mean 
its power to derive the largest possible set of exact implications from the smallest 
possible set of assumptions. In this acceptation, systematicity summarizes the five 
epistemic virtues described before – parsimony, generality, explanatory power, uni-
fying power, and exactness of implications – and can then be thought of as the main 
epistemic virtue of a theory. 
As far as the unifying power of a theory T  already synthesizes its generality, parsi-
mony and explanatory power, we can consider the systematicity of T  – to be la-
belled as  – as depending only on the unifying power and exactness of implica-
tions of 
)(TS
T . In particular, this dependence is positive: the more unifying a theory is, 
and the more exact its implications are, the more it is systematic. In the finite-[  
case, when it is possible to construct an index  for the global exactness of 
]d
GEI T ’s 
implications, we can also assign a numerical value to the systematicity of a theory. 
In this case, the systematicity index has the form: 
)(TS = ( ))(),( TGEITUPs  
where  is a real-valued function increasing both in UP  and GEI . Even in 
the case when no index GEI  is available, we can try to compare two theories with 
respect to their systematicity. If 
( )⋅s )(T )(T
0T  has more unifying power than 1T , and 0T ’s im-
plications are on the whole more exact than 1T ’s, then 0T  is more systematic than 
1T . 
The systematicity order is clearly incomplete, and its incompleteness originates from 
                                                 
11 On Cassirer and his philosophy of science see Friedman 2004 and 2005. 
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two independent sources. First, it can happen that two theories are not comparable 
with respect to the global exactness of their implications. Second, even if they are 
comparable and, say, the implications of 0T  are more exact than the implications of 
1T , 1T  can have more unifying power than 0T . In this case it is not clear which the-
ory is more systematic. 
 
4.7. Tractability 
Tractability is a further property that is often mentioned as an epistemic virtue of a 
theory. It appears related to the specific mathematical tools a theory employs and to 
the complexity of its demonstrations. If we look at a theory as a hypothetico-
deductive machinery with assumptions as inputs and implications as outputs, tracta-
bility is a virtue of the theory’s technology. Or, if we consider a theory as a function 
mapping  into AD× ID× , the tractability of the theory depends on the functional 
form itself of the theory. 
For real-valued functions, some tractability indexes based on the number of parame-
ters have been suggested12. However, a theory is not a real-valued function, and ac-
tually is a function only in a very abstract way. As far as I know, for complex func-
tional objects like theories no tractability index has been proposed, and I am not able 
to suggest a convincing one here. 
With respect to theory choice in economics, such flaw appears less severe if we con-
sider that economic theories generally employ the same mathematical tools: basic 
logic, set theory, topology, function analysis, optimization techniques, and matrix 
algebra. Moreover, theories concerning the same topic typically use the identical 
analytical apparatus and can therefore be considered equally tractable. When this is 
the case, tractability plays no role with respect to the choice among competing theo-
ries. 
 
4.8. Simplicity 
Simplicity is by far the most cited epistemic virtue. The problem with it is that sim-
plicity is too rich a notion, that in fact has been understood in a number of disparate 
ways: as paucity of parameters, parsimony, tractability, but also as plausibility, 
strong falsifiability, informativeness, and even as elegance and communicability13.  
I submit that all the elements that characterize simplicity as a syntactic virtue are ex-
                                                 
12 For an introduction on these issues see Forster-Sober 1994. 
13 On simplicity see Sober 1975, Zellner-Keuzenkamp-McAleer 2001, and Baker 2004. 
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pressed analytically by the epistemic virtues discussed in Sections 4.1-4.7. Therefore 
in what follows I will avoid referring to the all-embracing and hence confusing no-
tion of simplicity. 
 
5. SYSTEMATICITY VS. SEMANTIC VIRTUOSITY 
Based on the previous analysis of epistemic virtues, let us go back to our original 
questions: What is the role of epistemic virtues in economic theory choice? In par-
ticular: How much weight do the epistemic virtues of an economic theory receive 
compared with its descriptive accuracy, predictive power or other semantic virtues? 
As observed in the Introduction, epistemic virtues seem often to have more weight 
than semantic virtues in economic theory choice. When mainstream economists have 
to choose between a theory 0T , which is at odds with robust empirical evidence but 
is parsimonious, has large unifying power and numerous exact implications, and a 
theory 1T , which captures better empirical data, but has many ad hoc assumptions 
and vague implications, economists typically choose 0T . This does not mean that 
economists are not interested in the descriptive accuracy, the empirical relevance, or 
the predictive power of a theory, as many critics of mainstream economics have ar-
gued. Rather, such a choice simply indicates that for economists the epistemic vir-
tues of a theory are often more important than its semantic virtues. The present and 
the following sections attempt to spell out more exactly the relationship between 
epistemic and semantic virtues in economic theory choice. 
With respect to the epistemic virtues of a theory T , I focus on its systematicity, la-
beled as . As argued in the previous section, systematicity summarizes most of 
the other epistemic virtues. Therefore, if two competing theories are equally tracta-
ble, it is their systematicity that informs the choice between them. 
)(TS
As observed in Section 2, the semantic virtues of a theory, like its descriptive accu-
racy, empirical relevance, realism, or predictive power, can be eventually traced 
back to the correspondence between the theory’s definitions, assumptions, and im-
plications and the available evidences belonging to the set E . If we assume that 
there is no problem in assessing such correspondence, we can construct an index 
measuring how much a given theory is semantically virtuous.  
More exactly, we can think of three functions , , and  defined (respectively) 
from 
df af if
ED× , EA×  and EI ×  into { }1,0,1 +− : { }1,0,1: +−→× EDfd , 
{ }1,0,1: +−→E×Afa , and { }1,0,1: +−→×EIfi . We can call these functions interpre-
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tation functions. Each interpretation function is equal to 1+  in the case of a positive 
match between its argument and some element in E , whereas it is equal to  in 
the case of a negative match, that is, when its argument is at odds with some element 
in 
1−
E . The interpretation function is equal to zero when its argument is neither in ac-
cord nor at odds with the elements of E . This may happen because the argument is 
an abstract mathematical condition with no immediate empirical meaning. Based on 
the interpretation functions, an index  measuring the Semantic Virtuosity of a 
theory can be defined as follows: 
)T(SV
( )sd )
sa
(
∈I i
if
(T
)(TSV  = ∑
∈Dsd
df  + (∑∈A sa af  + )∑si s  
)SV  measures the excess of positive over negative matches of a theory. Clearly, 
the larger , the more semantically virtuous )(TSV T  is. 
In general, there is a trade-off between the systematicity and the semantic virtuosity 
of a theory. This is typically due to the fact that assumptions that have a high degree 
of correspondence with the available evidences tend to produce few exact implica-
tions, so lowering the theory’s systematicity. For instance, the usual assumption that 
the economic agent is rational in the sense that he maximizes his expected utility and 
updates his beliefs according to Bayes’ law is at odds with much empirical evidence. 
From a syntactic viewpoint, it would be more general and hence more parsimonious 
to make less restrictive assumptions on the agent’s psychology. For instance, the 
agent might also have passions, non-selfish motivations, cognitive limits, as well as 
cultural or sociological biases that let him deviate from expected utility maximiza-
tion and Bayesian updating. From a semantic viewpoint, providing the traditional 
homo oeconomicus with richer psychological traits would increase the accord be-
tween the assumptions of decision analysis and the available evidences, thereby ren-
dering the former semantically more virtuous. However, a theory of decision making 
based on such loose assumptions about the agent’s psychology would produce few 
exact implications for his behavior. What asset an investor purchases, what strategy 
a player chooses, how many commodity units a consumer buys would depend on the 
way the agent perceives the prices and frames the situation, on how much emotions 
and social values are important for his choice, or on the specific cognitive limits he 
displays. The agent’s possible choices would be barely restricted by the implications 
of the theory, which would be in accord with the available evidences, but only in the 
trivial sense of stating that anything can occur. In effect, the theorist’s task is typi-
cally that of weakening or relaxing the theory’s assumptions, so increasing their ac-
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cord with the available evidences, yet without ending up with an anything-goes-
theory that has no clear-cut implications. 
To recapitulate. When economists have to choose between two theories 0T  and 1T , 
they take into account both the epistemic and the semantic virtuosity of them. If the 
two theories are equally tractable, the epistemic virtues relevant for theory choice 
boil down to the theories’ systematicity. The semantic virtuosity of a theory can be 
traced back to the degree of correspondence between its definitions, assumptions 
and implications, and the available evidences. If 0T  is both more systematic and 
more semantically virtuous than 1T , then in all probability 0T  will be the chosen 
theory. However, in general there is an inverse correlation between systematicity 
and semantic virtuosity, so that it will often be the case that one theory is more sys-
tematic but less semantically virtuous than the other. In such circumstances, which 
theory will economists tend to choose? 
 
6. MORE SEMANTIC VIRTUOSITY, BUT WITHOUT LOSS OF                    
SYSTEMATICITY 
Like other empirical scientists, economists attempt to construct theories that capture 
the empirical evidences available to them as completely as possible. Using the terms 
introduced in the present work, we could say that economists try to maximize the 
semantic virtuosity of their theories. However, for economists also the systematicity 
of a theory is important. In particular, it seems that systematicity acts as a kind of 
constraint in the economists’ pursuit of semantic virtuosity: if a new theory 1T  is 
semantically more virtuous than the currently accepted theory 0T , but 1T  is not as 
systematic 0T , it is often the case that economists stick to 0T . 
Using the constrained-maximization language of basic microeconomics, we could 
say that economists attempt to maximize the semantic virtuosity of economic theory 
under the constraint of preserving its systematicity. In symbols, if  indicates 
the semantic virtuosity of a theory 
)(TSV
T ,  its systematicity, and  the systematic-
ity of the currently accepted theory 
)(TS
0
0S
T , then the economic theorist’s problem can be 
stated as follows: 
Maximize , under the constraint  )(TSV 0)( STS ≥
My thesis is that the epistemological principle “more semantic virtuosity, but with-
out loss of systematicity” regulates theory choice in economics. This means that, if 
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1T  is semantically more virtuous than 0T , i.e. , but )()( 01 TSVTSV ≥ 1T  is less sys-
tematic than 0T , i.e. , then economists will choose )()( 01 TSTS ≤ 0T . 
What it is put forward here is an epistemological metatheory of economic theory 
choice. In particular, this is descriptive, not normative metatheory: it attempts to 
capture the principles that actually regulate theory choice in economics, not those 
that, according to some alleged right methodological criterion, should regulate it. 
The set of objects D  this metatheory deals with are economic theories and their vir-
tues, both epistemic and semantic. The metatheory makes assumptions about the 
systematicity and the semantic virtuosity of economic theories (for instance, that 1T  
is semantically more virtuous but less systematic than 0T ), and delivers implications 
about the economists’ theory choice (that the chosen theory is 0T ) and hence about 
the dynamics of economic theory. 
From a syntactic viewpoint, this epistemological metatheory presents a serious flaw 
since it is not always able to deliver exact implications. In fact, as noticed in Section 
4.6, the systematicity order may result incomplete. And if 0T  and 1T  are not compa-
rable with respect to their systematicity, then the principle “more semantic virtuos-
ity, but without loss of systematicity” has no clear implications about the choice be-
tween 0T  and 1T . In such circumstances, theory choice will probably depend on dif-
ferent factors (e.g. of sociological, academic, or political nature) that are not cap-
tured by the present methatheory. 
The set of evidences this metatheory refers to is constituted by the history and pre-
sent status of economic science. The metatheory is semantically virtuous if large 
parts of the developments and current state of economics, can be rationalized as the 
result of the theory-choice principle “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of 
systematicity”. 
A correspondence between the proposed metatheory and the available evidences 
would not mean that economists calculate explicitly the systematicity and semantic-
virtuosity indexes of economic theories, and then choose the theory that maximizes 
semantic virtuosity without lowering systematicity. It would only mean that econo-
mists choose among theories as if they were following that principle. In the same 
sense, EUT does not state that the decision maker calculates mentally the expected 
utility of different lotteries, and then chooses the one with the highest expected util-
ity. EUT just states that if the decision maker’s preferences satisfy certain assump-
tions, then he chooses among lotteries as if he maximized his expected utility. In 
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other words, what matters for the semantic virtuosity of an economic theory and an 
epistemological metatheory is the same: that the set of available evidences can be 
described and rationalized as if it were the result of the principle assumed by the 
theory or the metatheory. 
The evidences relevant to an epistemological metatheory are probably even more 
constructed than the evidences relevant to an economic theory. What has been la-
beled as “the history and current status of a science” is in fact inevitably the product 
of historical reconstructions, epistemological interpretations, and theoretical beliefs. 
However, this does not mean that epistemological metatheories are arbitrary. The 
difficulties of assessing the correspondence between a metatheory and the evidences 
relevant to it are probably more severe, but in essence not different from those con-
cerning the assessment of the semantic virtuosity of an economic theory. 
Indeed, in a companion paper (Moscati 2007) I attempt to demonstrate that the his-
torical development of consumer demand theory can be convincingly rationalized as 
driven by the theory-choice rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of sys-
tematicity”. That companion paper is historical in nature and discursive in style, and 
it makes little use of the formal notions illustrated in the current work. In order to 
show how to employ these notions, the Appendix of the current work reconstructs 
the history of demand analysis between 1871 and the mid 1930s, applying to it the 
formal framework introduced in the previous Sections. 
 
7. FINAL REMARKS AND OPEN ISSUES 
In the present paper epistemic virtues were interpreted as syntactic properties of a 
scientific theory, and a formal theory of some of them was proposed. In particular, 
the epistemic virtue “systematicity” turned out to summarize most of the other epis-
temic virtues of a theory. Subsequently, the paper introduced a measure for the se-
mantic virtuosity of a theory and pointed out that in the construction of theories sci-
entists typically face a trade-off between the pursuit of systematicity and the pursuit 
of semantic virtuosity. Theory choice in science, and in particular in economic sci-
ence, crucially depends on this trade-off. The main thesis of the work is that econo-
mists’ theory choice is driven by a specific rule, namely “more semantic virtuosity, 
but without loss of systematicity”. The Appendix shows how the early development 
of demand theory can be rationalized as driven by that rule. In what follows, some 
of the issues the present work leaves open and may be the topic for future research 
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are discussed. 
First, the formal treatment of epistemic virtues proposed in the paper is very elemen-
tary and some refinements may be appropriate. In particular, an analytical definition 
of tractability (see above Section 4.7) is still missing. However, these limitations 
seem typical of a new approach. In fact, as far as I know, the idea of considering the 
epistemic virtues as syntactic properties of a theory, and modeling them in a formal 
way is a novelty in economic methodology. As said in the Introduction, in my opin-
ion the difficulties encountered in defining exactly what epistemic virtues amount to 
led traditional economic methodologies to underestimate their role in theory choice. 
Therefore I think that, despite its limitations, the formalistic approach introduced in 
the current paper opens a promising perspective for understanding and appreciating 
the importance of epistemic virtues. 
Second, even if the history of consumer theory can be rationalized as shaped by the 
rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of systematicity”, it is not obvious 
that the same holds for other branches of economics. As regards decision theory, 
game theory, general equilibrium theory as well as other parts of microeconomics, 
much anecdotal evidence suggests that also in these areas theory choice can be 
thought of as driven by the rule at issue. However, a detailed study investigating the 
history of these branches of microeconomics in the light of the trade-off between 
systematicity and semantic virtuosity is still missing. As for macroeconomic theo-
ries, not only are historical studies lacking, but even the anecdotal evidence about 
the hierarchy between systematicity and semantic virtuosity in theory choice (in the 
sense that when the pursuit of semantic virtuosity conflicts with the commitment to 
systematicity, the latter prevails) is weaker. 
Third, even if the development and current state of all parts of mainstream micro and 
macroeconomics could be rationalized as the result of the rule “more semantic virtu-
osity, but without loss of systematicity”, the question concerning the epistemological 
legitimacy of this rule would remain undecided. Is this rule only a methodological 
idiosyncrasy of that specific research program known as mainstream or neoclassical 
economics? Or, as the knowledge theory of Kant and the Marburg School suggests, 
does the pursuit of systematicity in science constitute the main principle that drives 
thought in the construction of scientific knowledge? Other economic approaches – 
as e.g. classical political economy, institutional economics, Austrian economics or 
Post-Keynesian economics – assign much less importance to the pursuit of sys-
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tematicity. Does this not mean that the rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without 
loss of systematicity”, far from being connected to some cognitive ideal of scientific 
knowledge, has only a contingent nature, and hence should be traced back to histori-
cal and sociological circumstances rather than to cognitive factors? 
The current paper does not take a stance on this point. Based on the present discus-
sion, the rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of systematicity” could be 
interpreted as a methodological idiosyncrasy of mainstream economics as well as a 
regulative principle of scientific cognition. 
I am convinced that the latter interpretation is the right one, and that mainstream 
theory superseded the other economic approaches and became the prevailing one 
precisely because the way it manages the trade-off between systematicity and se-
mantic virtuosity is in accord with the fundamental principles of scientific cognition. 
However, I can offer here no substantial argument to sustain this conviction. As far I 
can tell, not even Kant or the Marburg Neo-Kantians were able to demonstrate in a 
compelling way that the pursuit of systematicity constitutes the main regulative 
principle of scientific thought. 
Nowadays the issues concerning cognition and thought processes are investigated by 
cognitive sciences rather than philosophy. Indeed, cognitive scientists have investi-
gated systematicity as a fundamental property of thought. Jerry Fodor and others 
(1988, 1990) pointed out that thought is systematic in the sense that anyone who can 
think a thought of a certain form F  can also think thoughts whose form is just a 
variant of F . For instance, anyone who can think “John loves Mary”, can also think 
“Mary loves John”; or anyone who can infer Q from P, can also infer Q from P&Q14. 
Unfortunately, this notion of systematicity of thought concerns very basic cognitive 
processes, and has little relation to the systematicity pursued in higher cognitive 
functions like those operating in the elaboration of a scientific theory. Therefore, for 
the time being the question concerning the cognitive status and legitimacy of the 
rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of systematicity” remains unde-
cided. 
                                                 
14 On systematicity in this sense see also Cummins 1996 and Aizawa 2003. 
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APPENDIX 
FROM ADDITIVE TO GENERAL UTILITY IN DEMAND THEORY 
The present Appendix reconstructs the story of the acceptance in consumer demand 
theory of a general utility function in place of the additive utility function originally 
employed by the funding fathers of neoclassical theory. The Appendix is based on 
the first part of Moscati (2007), where the reader can find further details and biblio-
graphical references. 
 
A1. The Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory ( 1T ) 
Consumer demand theory originated in the marginalist value theories of Carl 
Menger, W. Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras, and became an autonomous body of 
doctrine with Alfred Marshall’s Principles. According to the marginalists, the eco-
nomic value of a commodity depends on the evaluation the subjects give to its mar-
ginal units. This evaluation was called “final degree of utility” by Jevons (1871), 
who first wrote down total utility as a cardinal function ( )xu  of the quantity of the 
good, and marginal utility as the function obtained by differentiating total utility. 
Jevons also assumed that marginal utility is a positive and decreasing function, and 
that total utility is an additively separable function. In mathematical terms, Jevons 
postulated that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nnn xuxuxuxxxu +++= ...,...,, 221121
( )ii x
, where  is the quantity con-
sumed of commodity i, and u  is the total utility function relative to commodity i, 
with . The marginal utility of commodity i is given by 
ix
ni ,...,2,1= ixu ∂∂ , which is as-
sumed to be positive ( 0>∂∂ ixu ) and decreasing ( 02 <ix2 ∂u∂ ) for each i. Additive 
separability implies that the cross-partial derivatives of the utility function are equal 
to zero, that is, 02 ∂∂ ixu =∂ jx  for ji ≠ .  
Based on these assumptions about total utility and marginal utility, Jevons obtained 
his famous “equations of exchange”. The equations state that, for the maximization 
of the traders’ utility under the budget constraints, when in equilibrium each trader 
demands all commodities and there are no trades at disequilibrium exchange ratios, 
for each trader the ratio between the marginal utilities of the commodities must be 
equal to the exchange ratio between the commodities (Jevons 1871: 95 ff.). That is, 
in equilibrium for each trader and any commodity  and , it must be that i j
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂ , where  and  are the prices of commodity i  and , respectively. ip jp j
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These are the first order conditions for utility maximization, which in Jevons’ setting 
also ensures that the second order conditions are satisfied. Therefore, if all com-
modities are demanded, first order conditions are sufficient for maximizing utility. 
Besides, in Jevons’ setting the commodity bundle that maximizes utility is unique. 
Based on the same assumptions as Jevons, in the Élements Walras systematized the 
subjective value theory in a coherent and general price theory, and first fixed the ex-
act relationship between the marginal utility of a good and its demand (Walras 1874: 
77 ff.). In particular, when total utility is additively separable and marginal utility is 
positive and decreasing, the demand for a good definitely decreases (increases) as its 
price rises (falls) (i.e. 0<∂∂ ii px ). In other words, under these assumptions the so-
called “law of demand” holds, and demand curves are always downward sloping. 
Jevons and Walras analyzed demand with respect to an exchange situation, where 
agents have an initial endowment of commodities and the relative prices at which 
they trade these commodities are the result of the exchange process. In his Princi-
ples (first edition 1890) Marshall considered instead the demand of an isolated 
agent, who initially has a monetary endowment to purchase commodities and for 
whom the commodity prices are fixed by the market. In this way, Marshall limited 
consumption analysis to the current boundaries and separated exchange theory from 
consumption theory. Apart from these innovations, Marshall’s theory of demand 
was substantially equivalent to that elaborated by Jevons and Walras, and in particu-
lar it crucially depended on the assumptions that total utility is additively separable 
and marginal utility is positive and decreasing. 
If we put together the elements of the theories of Jevons, Walras and Marshall, we 
obtain the theory of demand which was the dominant one during the period 1871-
1910. Let us label this theory 1T  and express it as a logical-mathematical object, 
with its definitions , assumptions , and implications . 1TD 1TA 1TI
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1T : The Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory 
1T
D  1TA  1TI  
1. Consumer 
 
2. Commodity 
 
3. Quantity of commodity i : 
 ix
 
4. Price of commodity :  i ip
 
5.Commodity bundle: ( )nxxx ,...,1=  
 
6. Consumer’s wealth:  w
 
7. Budget constraint: 
 wpx
n
i
ii =∑=1
 
8. Consumer’s utility function: ( )xu  
 
9. Optimal bundle: the one that 
maximizes ( )xu  under 
 wpx
n
i
ii =∑=1
 
10. Demand function: ii px ∂∂  
1. The consumer maximizes 
( )xu  under  wpxn
i
ii =∑=1
 
2. ( )xu  is a cardinal function 
 
3. ( )xu  is additively separa-
ble: ( )xu = ( ) ( )nn xuxu ++ ...11  
 
4. The marginal utility of any 
commodity is positive: 
0>∂∂= ii xuu  for every i 
 
5. The marginal utility of any 
commodity is decreasing: 
022 <∂∂= iii xuu  for every i 
 
6. ( )xu  is continuously dif-
ferentiable 
1. First-order (necessary) condi-
tions for utility maximization (in-
ternal solutions): 
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂  for any i and j 
 
2. The cross-partial derivatives of 
the utility function are null: 
02 =∂∂∂ ji xxu  for any i and j 
 
3. Second order conditions: since 
02 =∂∂∂ ji xxu , 022 <∂∂= iii xuu  
for every i is sufficient for utility 
maximization 
 
4. If the first and second order con-
ditions are satisfied, the optimal 
bundle is unique 
 
5. For any commodity, the demand 
function is decreasing: 0<∂ ii px∂  
 
A2. The Edgeworth theory ( 2T ) 
One of the elements of the Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory that appeared more at 
odds with the available evidences was the assumption that utility is additively sepa-
rable. In his Mathematical Psychics (1881) Edgeworth pointed out that in many 
cases the utilities of goods are interdependent. In particular, it can be the case that 
the marginal utility of one good diminishes when the quantity of another increases 
(that is, 02 <∂∂ ji xxu∂ ), as for tea and coffee. These goods were called rival or com-
petitive goods by Marshall and the other economists of the period. On the other 
hand, it can be the case that the marginal utility of one good increases when the 
quantity of another increases (that is, 02 >∂∂∂ ji xxu ), as for coffee and sugar. These 
were labeled as complementary goods. Yet, to capture the phenomenon of competi-
tive and complementary goods, additive utility must be abandoned, since it implies 
that 02 =∂∂∂ ji xxu . 
However, to make room for a utility function with a general form was not an easy 
task, since by weakening the additive assumption most of the exact implications of 
1T  faded away. First, in a general-utility setting the first order conditions for utility 
maximization no more assure that also the second order conditions are satisfied. And 
until V. Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy (Italian edition 1906; French edition 
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1909), it was not clear what were the appropriate second order conditions with any 
number of commodities. Second, with a general utility functions there can be a mul-
tiplicity of optimal bundles. Third, with a general utility function the demand for a 
good might decrease as well as increase when its price rises. The problem with this 
was that until the works of Pareto, W.E. Johnson and E. Slutsky (see below) it was 
not clear under which theoretical circumstances each case occurs, so that the theory 
vacuously stated that “anything goes”. 
Let us express this state of affairs in more formal terms, labeling as 2T  the demand 
theory resulting from Edgeworth’s suggestion of relaxing the additive utility as-
sumption. 
2T : The Edgeworth theory 
2T
D  2TA  2TI  
1. Consumer 
 
2. Commodity 
 
3. Quantity of commodity i :  ix
 
4. Price of commodity :  i ip
 
5.Commodity bundle: ( nxxx ,...,1= )  
 
6. Consumer’s wealth:  w
 
7. Budget constraint: ∑  wpxn
i
ii ==1
 
8. Consumer’s utility function: ( )xu  
 
9. Optimal bundle: the one that 
maximizes ( )xu  under  wpxn
i
ii =∑=1
 
10. Demand function: ii px ∂∂  
1. The consumer maximizes 
( )xu  under ∑  wpxn
i
ii ==1
 
2. ( )xu  is a cardinal function 
 
3. The marginal utility of any 
commodity is positive: 
0>∂∂= ii xuu  for every i 
 
4. The marginal utility of any 
commodity is decreasing: 
022 <∂∂= iii xuu  for every i 
 
5. ( )xu  is continuously differ-
entiable 
1. First-order (necessary) condi-
tions for utility maximization (in-
ternal solutions): 
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂  for any i and j 
 
2. For rival goods 02 <∂∂∂ ji xxu ; 
for complementary goods 
02 >∂∂∂ ji xxu ; for independent 
goods 0=jx2 ∂∂∂ ixu  
 
3. There can be a multiplicity of 
optimal bundles 
 
4. For any commodity, the demand 
function is typically decreasing but 
can also be increasing 
 
A3. Theory choice between 1T  and 2T  
Let us compare the semantic virtuosity and systematicity of the Jevons-Walras-
Marshall theory ( 1T ) and the Edgeworth theory ( 2T ). Notice that the two theories 
are equally tractable, since they employ the identical analytical apparatus. Therefore, 
tractability is not relevant for theory choice here. 
To evaluate the semantic virtuosity of the two theories we use the index  in-
troduced in Section 5. The objects defined in 
)(TSV
1T  and 2T  – that is,  and  – co-
incide. Therefore also the index measuring the correspondence between these sets of 
objects and the available evidences 
1T
D 2TD
E  takes the same value: ( )sd∑∈ 2TDsd df = . ( )∑ 1TD sd df∈sd
The assumptions of the two theories – i.e.  and  – coincide with the exception 1TA 2TA
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of the additive utility assumption, which is absent in 2T . Since this assumption ap-
pears at odds with the available evidences, the interpretation function  assigns to 
it the value -1. Therefore, by removing such assumption the correspondence level 
between assumptions and evidences increases:
af
( )s∑∈ 2TAsa a af > ( )∑∈ 1TAsa sa af
2T
I
. 
1T
I
1T
1+=if
1 2T
f
( )si ( )∑∈
T
Isi 1
si if
1
6 2T
As regards the implications of the two theories, – i.e.  and  – the implications 
of 2T  seem to correspond to the available evidences better than those of 1T . The im-
plication concerning the first-order conditions for utility maximization is identical 
among the two theories. As already observed, ’s implication stating that the cross-
partial derivatives of the utility function are equal to zero is at odds with the appar-
ent interdependence of the commodity utilities. Therefore for this implica-
tion, . On the contrary, 1−=if 2T  allows for the existence of rival and complemen-
tary goods. Hence, for 2T ’s second implication . As regards 2T ’s implication 
stating that there can be a multiplicity of optimal bundles, it is simply a loosening of 
1T ’s implication according to which the optimal bundle is unique. Therefore, if the 
evidences in E  support the latter they also support the former. With reference to the 
implication of 1T  that rules out an increasing demand function, it is at odds with the 
possible existence of the Giffen goods ( −=if ).  does not rule out an increasing 
demand function ( ). Finally, 1+=if 1T ’s second order conditions for utility maximi-
zation – that the marginal utility of every commodity is decreasing  – does not seem 
at odds with the available evidence, so that we can imagine that  assigns to it the 
value +1. Summing up, it turns out that 
i
∑
∈ 2TIsi
fi > . This means that the im-
plications of 2T  match the available evidences better than T ’s implications. 
If we put together the results concerning definitions, assumptions and implications 
we obtain that > . This means that, as claimed above, )( 2TSV )( 1TSV 2T  appears to be 
semantically more virtuous than 1T . 
What about the systematicity of the theories? First, we notice that 1T  has more uni-
fying power than 2T . In fact, the ratio between the number of implications and he 
number of assumptions for 1T  is equal to 5 , whereas for /  the same ratio dis-
plays a lower value, . 5/4
As regards the exactness of implications of the two theories, we are in the lucky case 
when the implications of the two theories can be always be compared. We do this 
using the exactness-points index introduced in Section 4.5. The first implication is 
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identical among the two theories. 2T ’s second implication – that about the sign of 
ji xxu ∂∂∂2  – is more exact than the analogous implication of 1T , since the latter is 
only a special case of the former. The third and fourth implications of 2T  are instead 
a loosening of the corresponding implications of 1T , so that with respect to them 1T  
is more exact than 2T . Finally, 1T ’s implication on the second order conditions for 
utility maximization has no correspondent in 2T , so that also in this case 1T  is more 
exact than 2T . Summing up, 1T  gets four exactness points whereas 2T  gets only 
two, so that the implications of 1T  are globally more exact than those of 2T . 
Since 1T  has more unifying power than 2T , and 1T ’s implications are on the whole 
more exact than 2T ’s, then we can say that 1T  is more systematic than 2T : 
> . Hence, in choosing between the Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory 
(
)( 1TS
1
)( 2TSV
T ) and the Edgeworth theory ( 2T ), the economists of the late 19th - early 20th cen-
tury faced the typical trade-off between systematicity and semantic virtuosity: the 
Edgeworth theory is semantically more virtuous, but less systematic than the Jevons-
Walras-Marshall theory. In this state of affairs, the rule “more semantic virtuosity, 
but without loss of systematicity” predicts that economists hold to the Jevons-
Walras-Marshall theory until the difficulties raised by the introduction of general 
utility are resolved. And this is what in fact happened. 
Between the publication of Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics and that of Pareto’s 
Manual, neoclassical economists generally recognized that the additive utility as-
sumption did not match the perceived evidences, but stuck to it in all their works. 
The subsequent editions of Walras’ Élements (1889-1900) and Marshall’s Principles 
(1890-1920) maintained the additive utility groundwork of the first editions. The 
theories of P.H. Wicksteed (1888), K. Wicksell (1893), E. Barone (1894) and, al-
though in a non-mathematically explicit form, M. Pantaleoni (1889 and 1898), F.F. 
von Wieser (1889), and J.B. Clark (1899) were also based on the additive utility as-
sumption. Also at the very beginning of the 20th century, the contributions in de-
mand theory were still developed within the additive framework, as the works of A. 
Aupetit (1901), C. Colson (1901), U. Ricci (1904), P. Boninsegni (1904), A.W. Flux 
(1904) and H. Cunynghame (1904) show. Things changed only when Pareto, John-
son and Slutsky showed how to construct a theory of demand based on general util-
ity not less systematic than the Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory. 
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A4. The Pareto-Johnson theory ( 3T ) 
Pareto is not usually remembered for having introduced a general utility function in 
demand theory, but for the attempt he made after 1900 to restate consumer equilib-
rium analysis without reference to cardinally measurable utility. However, he should 
also be credited for some important results that paved the way for the acceptance of 
general utility in consumer demand theory. 
In his first cardinalist phase Pareto built up general utility analysis, yet without using 
his own results. In fact, in the five-part article, “Considerazioni” he recognized the 
soundness of Edgeworth’s generalization, stated the exchange analysis in general 
utility terms, but then developed it within the additive framework (Pareto 1892-93, 
parts I-III). He subsequently resumed the general utility analysis and first provided 
the exact expression of ii px ∂∂  in the general utility case and for any number of 
goods, but then continued by using the additive utility which he declared “approxi-
mately true” (Pareto 1892-93, part V: 306-7). Similarly, in the Cours, Pareto devel-
oped the entire analysis with additive utility functions and discussed the general case 
only in a footnote (Pareto 1896-97: 332-4). 
After 1900 Pareto changed his approach to the topic. In the Manual he recognized 
that the additive assumption was an approximation made “in order to simplify the 
problems” but affirmed that “it is time now to take a step forward and also consider 
the case in which the ophelimity of a good depends on the consumption of all other 
goods” (cf. Pareto 1906: 241, and 1909: 253; ophelimity is the Paretian term for util-
ity). Accordingly, in the Appendix to the Manual Pareto provided a sufficient sec-
ond order condition for utility maximization with any number of goods, namely that 
the Hessian matrix of the utility function is negative definite (Pareto 1906: 550, and 
1909: 577). Moreover, in the Appendix to the French edition of his work, Pareto re-
introduced the general expression of ii px ∂∂  that he had already obtained in his 
1892 “Considerazioni” (cf. Pareto 1909: 580-1). Although Pareto’s second order 
conditions are too strong and the economic meaning of the Paretian formula for 
ii px ∂∂  is not clear, these results offered the first satisfactory solution to the prob-
lems induced by a general utility function. 
In 1913, the Cambridge logician W.E. Johnson published an important article on 
demand theory in the Economic Journal. Johnson’s treatment of the subject strongly 
resembles that set forth by Pareto in the Manual, even if the Cambridge logician did 
not cite the Italian economist. Independently of the question concerning Johnson’s 
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knowledge of Pareto’s work, the 1913 paper contains some original elements. In 
particular, Johnson analyzed the effects on demand of a variation in individual in-
come as well as in commodity prices in the two-commodity case. At a geometrical 
level, he constructed the income-consumption curve as well as the price-
consumption one. At a mathematical level, he provided an analytical treatment of 
“the case in which an increased price leads to an increase of the amount of the 
commodity bought (i.e. [the] Giffen’s paradox)” (Johnson 1913: 484) and demon-
strated that the Giffen goods are a subset of the inferior goods, that is, of the goods 
whose demand decreases when income increases. 
The definitive systematization of consumer demand theory in a general utility frame-
work was accomplished by Slutsky in his celebrated 1915 paper (Slutsky 1915). 
Slutsky, who referred admiringly to Pareto but did not cite Johnson, provided most 
of the results of consumer demand theory we still use today. However, Slutsky’s pa-
per remained basically ignored until the mid 1930s, so it did not play any significant 
role for the developments of demand analysis between 1915 and 1935. Therefore, 
with respect to the acceptance of a general utility function in demand analysis after 
1910, here only the theory emerging from the contributions of Pareto and Johnson 
will be taken into account. We can label the Pareto-Johnson theory as 3T  and ex-
press it in the usual logical-mathematical terms. 
3T : The Pareto-Johnson theory 
3T
D  3TA  3TI  
1. Consumer 
 
2. Commodity 
 
3. Quantity of commodity i :  ix
 
4. Price of commodity :  i ip
 
5.Commodity bundle: ( )nxxx ,...,1=  
 
6. Consumer’s wealth:  w
 
7. Budget constraint: ∑  wpxn
i
ii ==1
 
8. Consumer’s utility function: ( )xu  
 
9. Optimal bundle: the one that 
maximizes ( )xu  under 
 wpx
n
i
ii =∑=1
 
10. Demand function: ii px ∂∂  
1. The consumer maximizes 
( )xu  under  wpxn
i
ii =∑=1
 
2. ( )xu  is a cardinal func-
tion 
 
3. The marginal utility of 
any commodity is positive: 
0>∂∂= ii xuu  for every i 
 
4. The marginal utility of 
any commodity is decreas-
ing: 022 <∂∂= iii xuu  for 
every i 
 
5. ( )xu  is continuously dif-
ferentiable 
1. First-order (necessary) conditions for 
utility maximization (internal solu-
tions): 
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂  for any i and j 
 
2. For rival goods 02 <∂∂∂ ji xxu ; for 
complementary goods 0>2 ∂∂ ji xxu∂ ; 
for independent goods 0=2 ∂∂∂ ji xxu  
 
3. Second order (sufficient) conditions 
for utility maximization: the Hessian 
matrix of the utility function is negative 
definite 
 
4. If the first and second order condi-
tions are satisfied, the optimal bundle is 
unique 
 
5. Theoretical conditions under which 
0<∂∂ ii px  or 0>∂ ii px∂  (Giffen 
goods) 
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A5. Theory choice between 1T  and 3T  
Let us now compare the semantic virtuosity and systematicity of the Jevons-Walras-
Marshall theory ( 1T ) and the Pareto-Johnson theory ( 3T ). Notice that also these two 
theories employ the identical analytical apparatus and are therefore equally tractable. 
Hence, not even in this case is tractability relevant for theory choice. 
As regards semantic virtuosity, notice that the definitions and assumptions of the 
Pareto-Johnson theory ( 3T ) coincide with those of the Edgeworth theory ( 2T ). 
Therefore, based on what was argued in Section A3, we can affirm that 
=( )∑
∈ 3TDsd
sd df ( )∑∈ 1TDsd sd df  and >( )3T sa af∑∈Asa ( )∑∈ 1TAsa sa af . 
To evaluate the correspondence between the available evidences and the implica-
tions of the two theories, a table displaying these implications may be useful: 
Implications of 1T :  1TI Implications of 
3T :  3TI
1. First-order (necessary) conditions for utility 
maximization (internal solutions): 
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂  for any i and j 
1. First-order (necessary) conditions for utility 
maximization (internal solutions): 
j
i
j
i
p
p
xu
xu =∂∂
∂∂  for any i and j 
2. The cross-partial derivatives of the utility 
function are null: 02 =∂∂∂ ji xxu  for any i and j 
2. For rival goods 02 <∂∂∂ ji xxu ; for comple-
mentary goods 0>∂∂ ji xxu2∂ ; for independent 
goods 0=∂ jx2 ∂∂ ixu  
3. Second order conditions: since 
02 =∂∂∂ ji xxu , 022 <∂∂= iii xuu  for every i 
is sufficient for utility maximization 
3. Second order (sufficient) conditions for utility 
maximization: the Hessian matrix of the utility 
function is negative definite 
4. If the first and second order conditions are 
satisfied, the optimal bundle is unique 
4. If the first and second order conditions are 
satisfied, the optimal bundle is unique 
5. For any commodity, the demand function is 
decreasing: 0<∂ ii px∂  
5. Theoretical conditions under which 
0<∂∂ ii px  or 0>∂∂ ii px  (Giffen goods) 
 
The first and fourth implications are identical for the two theories. As observed in 
Section A3, the second and fifth implications of 1T  appear to be at odds with the 
perceived evidences in E  (hence 1−=if  for both of them), whereas the third one 
does not conflict with E  ( ). As regards 1+=if 3T , its second and fifth implications 
seem in accord with the perceived existence of rival, complementary and Giffen 
goods (therefore,  for both of them). With respect to the third implication of 1+=if
3T , it appears quite difficult to assess whether the available evidence supports the 
negative definiteness of Hessian matrix of the utility function. Therefore, I submit 
that the value the interpretation function should assign to this implication is zero 
( ). Summing up, we have that 0=if 3T ’s implications match the available evidences 
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better than the implications of 1T : ( )∑
∈ 3TIsi
si if > ( )∑∈ 1TIsi si if . If we put together the results 
concerning definitions, assumptions and implications we obtain that 
> , which means that the Pareto-Johnson theory is semantically more 
virtuous than the Jevons-Walras-Marshall theory. 
)( 3TSV )( 1TSV
6
55 6 3
1T
1
1
3 1
3
3T
Let us now compare the systematicity of the two theories. As observed in Section 
A3, the ratio between the number of assumptions and the number of implications for 
the Jevons-Walras-Marshall is equal to 5 . For the Pareto-Johnson theory this ratio 
is , which is greater than 5 . Therefore T  has more unifying power than 1T . 
As regards the exactness of implications, it turns out that those of 3T  are more exact 
than those of . In fact, implications one and four are identical for the two theories, 
whereas the second, third and fifth implications of T  are only a special case of the 
analogous implications of 3T . Therefore, T  gets two exactness-of-implications 
points whereas 3T  gets five. 
Summing up, T  has more unifying power than T , and 3T ’s implications are also 
more exact than 1T ’s, so that T  is more systematic than 1T : > . In con-
clusion, 
)( 3TS )( 1TSV
 is both more systematic and semantically virtuous than 1T . In this state 
of affairs, the rule “more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of systematicity” pre-
dicts that economists embrace the Pareto-Johnson theory, which is what actually 
happened. 
The works of Pareto and Johnson demonstrated that the introduction of general util-
ity did not imply lowering the systematicity of the consumer demand theory. Indeed, 
from the 1910s on general utility became the standard whereas additive utility be-
came a special case, as the works of Wicksteed (1910), G. Borgatta (1911-12a and 
1911-12b), A. Osorio (1913), W. Zawadzky (1914), L. Amoroso (1921 and 1928), 
A.L. Bowley (1924), P. Boninsegni (1925), M. Fanno (1925-26), R. Frisch (1926), 
A. de Pietri-Tonelli (1927), F. Divisia (1928), G.C. Evans (1930), O. Weinberger 
(1930), A. Bordin (1932), V. Dominedò (1933) and H. Schultz (1933) show. 
In effect, between the publication of Pareto’s Manual and the mid 1930s, the main 
challenge for consumer analysis was related to the introduction of ordinal utility 
rather than general utility into the theory’s assumptions. It turns out that the rule 
“more semantic virtuosity, but without loss of systematicity” makes sense also of 
this phase of the development of demand analysis. This part of the story can be 
found in Moscati 2007. 
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